OECD Journal: Competition Law and Policy

Anglais
Frequency :
Annuel
ISSN :
1609-7521 (en ligne)
ISSN :
1560-7771 (imprimé)
DOI :
10.1787/16097521
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This journal draws on the best of the recent work done for and by the OECD Committee on Competition Law and Policy. Its articles provide insight into the thinking a competition law enforcers, and focus on the practical application of competition law and policy. Here’s what Robert Pitofsky, Chairman of the US Federal Trade Commission said about this new journal when it was launched: "Global competition is the wave of the future, and comparative analysis of the laws and practices of various members of the worldwide community of nations is a necessary corollary. This new OECD Journal of Competition Law and Policy, compiled from OECD Round Table discussions, summaries of recent developments, and articles on topics of special interest, will introduce regulators, practitioners, and scholars to different regulatory approaches around the world and will allow us to consider in a more informed way the strengths and weaknesses of our own systems."

Now published as part of the OECD Journal package.

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Articles récents Cacher / Cacher / Voir les abstracts

Sélectionner Number Date Article Volume et numéro Cliquez pour accéder
  22 juin 2011 Country review of Argentina
OCDE
The Inter-American Development Bank and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development co-operate in competition law and policy to promote increased economic growth, employment and economic efficiency and a higher average standard of living in the medium to long term. There is increasing consensus that sound competition law and policy are essential to achieving these goals. "Peer review" is a core element of OECD work. The mechanisms of peer review vary, but it is founded upon the willingness of all OECD countries and their partners to submit their laws and policies to substantive questioning by other members. This process provides valuable insights to the reviewed country and promotes transparency and mutual understanding for the benefit of all. The benefits of this process are particularly clear in the area of competition law and policy. As a result of the activities of the Competition Committee, OECD countries that once had real conflicts on competition issues have become partners in seeking to halt harmful international anticompetitive practices. The Committee has also become an important forum for assessing and demonstrating the usefulness of applying competition policy principles to economic and other regulatory systems. IDB/OECD co-operation in competition law and policy centers on annual meetings of the Latin American Competition Forum. LACF meetings include substantive roundtable discussions and peer reviews of national laws and institutions. The peer reviews have examined Brazil, Chile, Peru and now Argentina. The IDB is pleased to participate and finance this work, as part of its efforts to promote a better business climate for investment in the counties of Latin America and the Caribbean. We want to thank the Government of Argentina for volunteering to be peer reviewed at the fourth LACF meeting, held in San Salvador, El Salvador, on 11-12 July, 2006. It was encouraging to hear Argentina’s Delegation confirm at the meeting that the report’s recommendations were helpful and to hear from Delegates of other countries that this review has improved their understanding of Argentina’s competition law and policy. Finally, we want to thank Mr. John Clark, the author of the report, and the many competition officials whose written and oral contributions to the Forum have been so important to its success.
Volume 11 Numéro 3 Cliquez pour accéder: 
  22 juin 2011 Competition and regulation in retail banking
OCDE
The Competition Committee debated retail banking in October 2006. Competition can improve the functioning of the retail banking sector without harming prudential regulation. The efficient functioning of the sector is important for economic performance. The sector is considered special primarily because of externalities related to potential "contagion" effects stemming from (i) the withdrawal-upondemand characteristic of some bank deposits and (ii) the role banks play in the payment system, and (iii) the fact that banks are important for the funding of consumers and SMEs. Customer mobility and choice is essential to simulate retail-banking competition. An important observation is that the degree of customer mobility is low and the longevity of customer-bank relationships is long. Financial information sharing platforms should therefore be promoted and, where limited by privacy laws, privacy laws should be modified in a way that maintains the goal of protecting privacy while also allowing consumers to receive the benefits of credit ratings.
Volume 11 Numéro 3 Cliquez pour accéder: 
  22 juin 2011 Competition and efficient usage of payment cards
OCDE
The OECD Competition Committee debated competition and efficient usage of payment cards in June 2006. In recent years, debit and credit cards have become increasingly common as retail payment mechanisms and have increasingly displaced checks and cash. The roundtable discussed potential market power and pricesetting abuses related to payment cards, reviewed the regulatory (or self-regulatory) mechanisms that sometimes govern the operation of card networks and considered methods for increasing the role of competitive forces among payment cards. A market failure exists because costs for different payment mechanisms are rarely reflected in consumer prices. Consideration should be given to permitting merchants to form payment ventures, as this would promote system competition between owners with different incentives, and to promoting entry by potential new technologies that would not involve existing payment networks. Many other policy options are discussed.
Volume 11 Numéro 3 Cliquez pour accéder: 
  21 juin 2011 Country review: Ukraine
OCDE
This report* was the basis of a two hour and a half peer review in the OECD Global Forum on Competition (GFC) on 21 February 2008. It assesses the development and application of competition law and policy in Ukraine, focusing on activities over the previous five years (2003-07). The report concludes that Ukraine has a comprehensive and well-designed competition law and, in the AMC, an effectively managed and well-regarded agency to enforce it. The report also identifies an array of problems confronting Ukraine in the competition law arena, and makes various remedial proposals, including recommendations dealing with the AMC’s budget allocation, autonomy, investigative tools, transparency, enforcement priorities, and relationships with other law enforcement agencies. Additional recommendations in the report focus on the competition law’s merger notification requirements and procedures, state aid legislation, penalties for unlawful conduct and penalty collection procedures, competition advocacy, harmonization with the European Union’s competition laws, and the elimination of conflicting provisions in Ukraine’s Commercial Code.
Volume 11 Numéro 2 Cliquez pour accéder: 
  21 juin 2011 Plea bargaining
OCDE

Plea agreements or negotiated settlements can be an efficient way to formally dispose of  cartel cases.They can provide substantial benefits to competition authorities by allowing them to allocate their resources more efficiently and to increase enforcement activities, thus 
achieving greater deterrence. Plea agreements have substantial benefits for defendants as well.

Volume 11 Numéro 2 Cliquez pour accéder: 
  21 juin 2011 Private remedies
OCDE
The OECD Competition Committee debated private remedies in June 2006. The roundtable focused on class actions/collective actions and the interface between private enforcement and public enforcement: • Class Actions/Collective Actions: There is a strong case for the use fo class actions/collective actions to raise levels of deterrence and achieve greater compliance with competition laws, as theses actions may be the only practical way to ensure that customers with small claims also have their day in court. • Interface between Public and Private Enforcement: There is a widely shared concern that private litigation in competition cases can interfere with leniency programs in cartel cases. There is a trade-off between enabling the victims of a cartel to recover damages and incentives for cartel members to come forward, and no-one really knows with certainty how much protection from private litigation and damage awards is necessary so as not to deter leniency applicants. The prevailing view is that the integrity of leniency programs should be protected by a range of measures that limit a leniency applicant’s exposure to civil damages, but some delegates felt that the current trend provided unnecessary protection to leniency applicants to the detriment of private plaintiffs.
Volume 11 Numéro 2 Cliquez pour accéder: 
  16 jui 2010 Country Review: Peru
OCDE
The Competition Peer Review Report of Peru is the fourth one of a non-OECD country. South Africa and Russia were reviewed at meetings of the OECD Global Forum on Competition (GFC). Chile, and now Peru, were reviewed at meetings of the Latin American Competition Forum (LACF), organised by the OECD and the Inter- American Development Bank (IDB). All four reviews confirm that the peer review process is an extremely useful means of promoting co-operation and voluntary convergence among OECD and non-OECD economies, providing both transparency and a candid discussion of what constitutes "best practice" in different situations.
Volume 11 Numéro 1 Cliquez pour accéder: 
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