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Board Practices

Incentives and Governing Risks

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This publication examines how effectively boards manage to align executive and board remuneration with the longer-term interests of their companies. This is a major and ongoing issue in many companies and one of the key failures highlighted by the financial crisis. Aligning incentives seems to be far more problematic in companies and jurisdictions with a dispersed shareholding structure since, where dominant or controlling shareholders exist, they seem to act as a moderating force on remuneration outcomes.  

The reader will learn about the effectiveness of boards in fulfilling their obligation to align executive and board remuneration with the longer term interests of their companies. 

Anglais

Aligning Executive Interests with the Long-term Interest of the Company

The ability to effectively oversee executive remuneration is a central element of the current corporate governance debate. In responding to this and other corporate governance challenges, the OECD’s Corporate Governance Committee launched a peer review process designed to facilitate the effective implementation of the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance and to assist market participants and policy makers to respond to emerging corporate governance risks. The process builds on Principle V.A.4. of the OECD Principles. This principle recommends that the board should fulfill certain key functions including “aligning key executive and board remuneration with the longer term interests of the company and its shareholders”. This chapter discusses the market environment, the legal and regulatory frameworks and responses to remuneration and board practices, in particular, the use of remuneration consultants and board members’ responsibility for shareholder engagement.

Anglais

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