OECD Journal: Financial Market Trends

Anglais
Frequency :
Semestriel
ISSN :
1995-2872 (en ligne)
ISSN :
1995-2864 (imprimé)
DOI :
10.1787/19952872
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The twice-yearly journal from OECD providing timely analyses and statistics on financial matters of topical interest and longer-term developments in specific financial sectors. Each issue provides a brief update of trends and prospects in the international and major domestic financial markets along with articles covering such topics as structural and regulatory developments in OECD financial systems, trends in foreign direct investment, trends in privatization, and financial sector statistics covering areas such as bank profitability, insurance, and institutional investors.

Periodically, a small number of articles within one field of financial sector developments – constituting the so-called special focus for the particular issue – may be included.

Now published as part of the OECD Journal package.

 

Articles récents Cacher / Cacher / Voir les résumés

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  27 août 2014 Policy responses to the issue of implicit bank debt guarantees
Sebastian Schich, Yesim Aydin

Bank regulatory reform is expected to limit the value of implicit bank debt guarantees, even if not plainly targeting such values. According to the responses from 35 countries to a survey on implicit bank debt guarantees, there is however no one specific policy capable of fully eliminating the market perception that bank debt is "special". A mixture of several different and complementary policy measures is considered more helpful, with recurrent elements including the implementation of internationally agreed capital and liquidity standards, the tightening of micro- and macro-prudential supervision and making bank failure resolution more effective. As regards the overall thrust of bank regulatory reform efforts, most respondents suggest "strengthening banks" and "strengthening the capacity to withdraw the guarantee function" describes best their own efforts. By contrast, labelling certain policy measures as "effectively charging a user fee" is considered problematic as it might make explicit what currently is at most implicit.

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  27 août 2014 Measurement and analysis of implicit guarantees for bank debt
Sebastian Schich, Yesim Aydin

Implicit guarantees of bank debt create economic costs and distortions, which is why policy makers have clearly announced their intention to rein in the value of implicit guarantees. This report identifies key findings from the responses from 35 countries to a survey on implicit guarantees. The survey shows that while authorities have not settled on the best way of measuring such guarantees, it is important to produce estimates of the value of these guarantees to facilitate the task of assessing progress in bank regulatory reform and in reducing the value of these guarantees. Whatever method is used, the value of implicit bank debt guarantees is substantial. In absolute terms, the estimated funding cost advantages can amount to about USD 10 billion on an annual basis for banking sectors in some jurisdictions and, in many cases, they are estimated to represent the equivalent of 1% of domestic GDP; in crisis situations, this value could rise to close to 3% of domestic GDP.

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    http://oecd.metastore.ingenta.com/content/2714011ec002.pdf
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  08 août 2014 Problems in the international financial system
Adrian Blundell-Wignall, Caroline Roulet

Since the 1980s OECD investment-saving correlations – as an inverse measure of economic openness – indicate a very wide disparity of openness between the OECD and emerging market economies (EMEs) with an absence of open markets in the latter. Given the increasing weight of EMEs in the world economy this pattern of growth with disparity of openness is ultimately unsustainable. This approach to development is not in the interests of EMEs in the post-crisis global environment. Various studies show how the absence of capital mobility inhibits development though private sector capital expenditure at the firm level. This paper generalises those findings in a panel study, showing that in the period since 2008 the increased presence of capital controls is associated with highly significant negative effects on business investment. It suggests that the world economy could be entering a more dangerous phase of potential instability that is not in the interests of either the advanced or the emerging world. There is scope for better policies to encourage more openness; the OECD Codes of Liberalisation could be an effective tool for managing the reform process.

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  08 août 2014 Improving the monitoring of the value of implicit guarantees for bank debt
Sebastian Schich, Michiel Bijlsma, Remco Mocking

The value of implicit guarantees has declined from its peak at the height of the financial crisis, which is consistent with progress made regarding the bank regulatory reform agenda, as one would expect that many of the reform measures imply a more limited value of implicit guarantees for bank debt. Implicit guarantees persist however and their value continues to be significant, estimated here to be equivalent to EUR 50 billion of annual funding costs savings for a sample of more than 100 large European banks. This estimated funding cost advantage is a conservative estimate as it only focuses on one type of debt that can be measured in "real-time", that is as data on credit ratings, debt issuance and prices of debt become available. In any case, bank debt continues to be considered "special" by market participants and this observation implies that the substantial economic distortions, including distortions to risk-taking incentives and competition, arising from this situation also persist.

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  20 mars 2014 SMEs and the credit crunch
Gert Wehinger

After a brief overview of current financing difficulties for SMEs and policy measures to support SME lending during the crisis,this article presents a literature review related to difficulties in SME’s access to finance during the crisis, against a background of a sharp decline in bank profitability and an erosion of bank capital that negatively affected lending. The articles reviewed are classified according to four main issues of interest:the impairment of the bank-credit channel and its economic effects;factors potentially attenuating the effect of a financial squeeze;the role of global banking in mitigating but also transmitting financial shocks; and,looking ahead,issues related to so-called "credit-less recoveries" that should be relevant in guiding policy makers in the current environment of financial deleveraging. All the results hold important implications for policy making given the bail-outs and the large injections ofliquidity by central banks during the crisis.
 


 

Volume 2013 Numéro 2 Cliquez pour accéder: 
    http://oecd.metastore.ingenta.com/content/2713021ec006.pdf
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  20 mars 2014 Institutional investors and ownership engagement
Serdar Çelik, Mats Isaksson

This article provides a framework for analysing the character and degree of ownership engagement by institutional investors.It argues that the general term "institutional investor" in itself doesn’t say very much about the quality or degree of ownership engagement. It is therefore an evasive "shorthand" for policy discussions about ownership engagement. The reason is that there are large differences in ownership engagement between different categories of institutional investors. There are also differences in ownership engagement within the same category of institutional investors such as hedge funds, investment funds,etc. These differences arise from the fact that the degree of ownership engagement is determined by a number of different features and choices that together make up the institutional investor’s "business model". When ownership engagement is not a central part of the business model,public policies and voluntary standards aiming to improve the quality of ownership engagement among institutional investors are likely to have limited effect. Based on an empirical overview of the relative sise of different categories of institutional investors, the article identifies a set of 7 features and 19 choices that in different combinations define the institutional investor’s business model. These features and choices are then used to establish a taxonomy for identifying different degrees of ownership engagement ranging from "no engagement" to "inside engagement".

Volume 2013 Numéro 2 Cliquez pour accéder: 
    http://oecd.metastore.ingenta.com/content/2713021ec005.pdf
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  20 mars 2014 Bank business models and the separation issue
Adrian Blundell-Wignall, Paul Atkinson, Caroline Roulet

The main hallmarks of the global financial crisis were too-big-to-fail institutions taking on too much risk with other people’s money while gains were privatised and losses socialised. It is shown that banks need little capital in calm periods, but in a crisis they need too much – there is no reasonable ex-ante capital rule for large systemically important financial institutions that will make them safe. The bank regulators paradox is that large complex and interconnected banks need very little capital in the good times, but they can never have enough in an extreme crisis. Separation is required to deal with this problem, which derives mainly from counterparty risk. The study suggests banks should be considered for separation into a ring-fenced non-operating holding company (NOHC) structure with ring-fencing when they pass a key allowable threshold for the gross market value (GMV) of derivatives, a case which is reinforced if the bank has high wholesale funding and low levels of liquid trading assets. The pricing of derivatives and repos would become more commensurate with the risks if the NOHC proposal were to be pursued as a unifying strategy for the different national approaches. Most of the objections to this structure are summarised and rebutted. Other national proposals for separation in Switzerland, the Volcker rule, the Vickers rule, and the Liikanen proposal are argued to be inferior to the ring-fenced NOHC proposal, on the grounds that empirical evidence about what matters for a safe business model is not taken properly into account.
JEL classification: G01, G15, G18, G20, G21, G24, G28
Keywords: Financial crisis, derivatives, bank business models, distance-to-default, structural bank separation, banking reform, GSIFI banks

Volume 2013 Numéro 2 Cliquez pour accéder: 
    http://oecd.metastore.ingenta.com/content/2713021ec004.pdf
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