OECD Journal: Financial Market Trends

Frequency :
Semestriel
ISSN :
1995-2872 (en ligne)
ISSN :
1995-2864 (imprimé)
DOI :
10.1787/19952872
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The twice-yearly journal from OECD providing timely analyses and statistics on financial matters of topical interest and longer-term developments in specific financial sectors. Each issue provides a brief update of trends and prospects in the international and major domestic financial markets along with articles covering such topics as structural and regulatory developments in OECD financial systems, trends in foreign direct investment, trends in privatization, and financial sector statistics covering areas such as bank profitability, insurance, and institutional investors.

Periodically, a small number of articles within one field of financial sector developments – constituting the so-called special focus for the particular issue – may be included.

Now published as part of the OECD Journal package.

 
 
 

Volume 2011, Numéro 2 You do not have access to this content

Date de publication :
23 mars 2012
DOI :
10.1787/fmt-v2011-2-en

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  23 mars 2012 Cliquez pour accéder: 
    http://oecd.metastore.ingenta.com/content/2711021ec013.pdf
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Foreword
Hans J. Blommestein, Ahmet Keskinler, Perla Ibarlucea Flores
This issue of Financial Market Trends compiles, as always, the articles that have been released online over the past few months. It features, as Part I, selected articles based on presentations given at the Symposium on "Financial crisis management and the use of government guarantees" in October 2011, which were first released between October and December 2011. The Symposium, part of the OECD’s work on financial sector guarantees, gathered policy makers, policy consultants and other academics to discuss the policy response to the financial crisis, the use of guarantees, failure resolution, banking and sovereign debt interconnections, as well as other financial safety net aspects. Policy proposals covered issues as to how to improve the use of government-supported guarantees and the design of the financial safety net, with a view to enhancing existing mechanisms to avert or contain future crises. A summary of the Symposium is included at the end of each of the articles to facilitate their distribution as self-contained papers.
  23 mars 2012 Cliquez pour accéder: 
    http://oecd.metastore.ingenta.com/content/2711021ec002.pdf
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Managing Crises without Government Guarantees
Christine M. Cumming
Experience illustrates that, for successful crisis management, there is no substitute for early intervention and, if possible, a private sector solution in preserving value in the firm and limiting externalities. Early intervention, in turn, calls for strong supervision. Even with a much stronger cross-border resolution process, some type of contingent arrangements in reserve will continue to be necessary. Despite their associated problems, guarantees and market backstops have been an important element in preserving liquidity and restoring market functionality and it would be difficult to manage financial crises without them. Other forms of intervention are likely to be more intrusive.
  23 mars 2012 Cliquez pour accéder: 
    http://oecd.metastore.ingenta.com/content/2711021ec003.pdf
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Sovereign and Banking Sector Debt
Arturo Estrella, Sebastian Schich
Sovereigns effectively provided the function of guarantor-of-last resort in response to the 2008/09 banking crisis, and recent bank funding challenges have led to renewed calls for explicit sovereign bank debt guarantees. The present paper focuses on the interconnections between the values of sovereign and bank debt that arise through sovereign guarantees for banks. We develop a valuation framework based on concepts of contingent claims analysis. In particular, we investigate the value of insurance of risky bank debt when the sovereign providing the guarantee can itself be risky. The framework is in principle applicable both to explicit and implicit guarantees and it is applied here to a measure of implicit external (mostly from the sovereign) support for the debt of a crosssection of 100 large European banks. Consistent with the model, the implicit support is higher, the lower the bank’s stand-alone creditworthiness and the higher the sovereign’s creditworthiness. These results have implications for pricing sovereign bank debt guarantees, be they provided individually by each sovereign for its domestic banks or by several sovereigns jointly. In the former case, stronger sovereigns should charge higher premiums for their bank debt guarantees for a given bank risk if the aim is to avoid creating distortions to competition. In the latter, they should receive greater allotments of premium incomes even where the share of the guarantees provided are identical among sovereigns.
  23 mars 2012 Cliquez pour accéder: 
    http://oecd.metastore.ingenta.com/content/2711021ec004.pdf
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Public Guarantees on Bank Bonds
Giuseppe Grande, Aviram Levy, Fabio Panetta, Andrea Zaghini
The government guarantees on bank bonds adopted in 2008 in many advanced economies to support the banking systems were broadly effective in resuming bank funding and preventing a credit crunch. The guarantees, however, also caused distortions in the cost of bank borrowing. Their reintroduction might help alleviate the current pressures on banks caused by the sovereign debt crisis, but the pricing mechanism should ensure a level playing field. Moreover, given the sharp deterioration in the creditworthiness of sovereign borrowers, it may be envisaged to entrust the provision of the guarantees to a supranational organisation.
  23 mars 2012 Cliquez pour accéder: 
    http://oecd.metastore.ingenta.com/content/2711021ec005.pdf
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  • http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/finance-and-investment/the-potential-impact-of-banking-crises-on-public-finances_fmt-2011-5k9cswn0nhbr
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The Potential Impact of Banking Crises on Public Finances
Francesca Campolongo, Massimo Marchesi, Riccardo De Lisa
This paper presents an application of the SYMBOL model, which was recently developed by the European Commission. In this application, we assess the potential impact of a crisis in the banking sector on public finances in four EU Member States chosen as examples. Results show that two Member States have a relatively higher probability of being in a situation where government finances have to cover losses generated in the banking system.
  23 mars 2012 Cliquez pour accéder: 
    http://oecd.metastore.ingenta.com/content/2711021ec006.pdf
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The Fault Lines in Cross-Border Banking
Már Guðmundsson
This paper discusses the fault lines in cross-border banking, both at the global level and at the European Union/European Economic Area (EU/EEA) level, using the case of the three Icelandic cross-border banks as an example. Cross-currency liquidity risk built up prior to the crisis, especially maturity mismatches in foreign currency. This risk tended to be grossly underestimated at the time. There was a run on banks’ FX liabilities after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008. The Icelandic banks were highly vulnerable to such a run and lacked a credible lender of last resort (LOLR) in terms of foreign currency. The crisis also exposed serious flaws in the EU and EEA framework for cross-border banking, including deposit insurance. One of the main lessons of the Icelandic experience is that sizeable cross-border banking operations in small countries with their own currency come with very significant risks. The Icelandic experience suggests that further reforms are needed for cross-border banking activities in the Single Market, where the key issue is to match the European passport for banks with pan- European supervision, deposit insurance and LOLR. Domestic banks could remain in the domestic system.
  23 mars 2012 Cliquez pour accéder: 
    http://oecd.metastore.ingenta.com/content/2711021ec007.pdf
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The Macro-Prudential Authority
Charles A.E. Goodhart
Neither the achievement of price stability, via the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC), nor the application of micro-prudential oversight, via the Financial Services Authority (FSA), led to overall financial stability. There is a gap that needs to be filled by a macro-prudential authority (M-PA), the Financial Policy Committee (FPC) in the United Kingdom. The only macro-prudential instrument used heretofore has been the publication of Financial Stability Reviews (FSR). While worthy, these have been ineffective. The M-PA should have the following powers: First, the power to alter the composition of Central Bank (CB) assets, by adding to (subtracting from) its holdings of claims on the private sector. The argument that such actions are ‘quasi-fiscal’, and should therefore not be undertaken, is not supported. Second, the power to adjust margins (Capital adequacy ratios, liquidity ratios, loan-to-value ratios, etc.) to influence the conduct of financial intermediation. The argument that the use of such powers puts the FPC in a difficult conflict with the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) is not supported...
  23 mars 2012 Cliquez pour accéder: 
    http://oecd.metastore.ingenta.com/content/2711021ec008.pdf
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Developing a Framework for Effective Financial Crisis Management
Dalvinder Singh, John Raymond LaBrosse
This article discusses the roles and responsibilities of the various agencies that are part of the financial system safety net, and it sets out a framework for the decision-making process for these actors in the management of a financial crisis. In this context, the article discusses issues of micro- and macro-prudential oversight and argues that more needs to be done to ensure accountability, independence, transparency and integrity of the various actors of the financial system safety net.
  23 mars 2012 Cliquez pour accéder: 
    http://oecd.metastore.ingenta.com/content/2711021ec009.pdf
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The Federal Agency for Financial Market Stabilisation in Germany
Christopher Pleister
One important element of the response to the crisis in Germany was the establishment of a new institution, the Bundesanstalt für Finanzmarktstabilisierung (Federal Agency for Financial Market Stabilisation, henceforth FMSA). The aim was to supplement the range of tasks performed by the Deutsche Bundesbank and the Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority). Neither one of these two institutions nor the legal framework, including especially the insolvency laws, were adequate for rescuing and restructuring stressed banks. While the FMSA was initially conceived as a temporary undertaking, the new German Restructuring Act implies that the FMSA is now a permanent part of the German banking landscape.
  23 mars 2012 Cliquez pour accéder: 
    http://oecd.metastore.ingenta.com/content/2711021ec010.pdf
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The EU Architecture to Avert a Sovereign Debt Crisis
Rodrigo Olivares-Caminal
This paper analyses what has been the EU institutional reaction to the Euro-area sovereign debt problems, focusing in particular on the new architecture designed to avert a financial crisis. It analyses i) the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM), an EU financial assistance feature available to all 27 member states; ii) the European Financial Stabilisation Facility (EFSF), a temporary credit-enhanced Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) with minimal capitalisation created to raise funds from the capital markets (via an investment grade rating) and to provide financial assistance to distressed euroarea Member States (EAMS) at comparatively lower interest rates; and iii) the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), an intergovernmental organisation under public international law. Finally, some concluding remarks are provided.
  23 mars 2012 Cliquez pour accéder: 
    http://oecd.metastore.ingenta.com/content/2711021ec011.pdf
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Solving the Financial and Sovereign Debt Crisis in Europe
Adrian Blundell-Wignall
This paper examines the policies that have been proposed to solve the financial and sovereign debt crisis in Europe, against the backdrop of what the real underlying problems are: extreme differences in competitiveness; the absence of a growth strategy; sovereign, household and corporate debt at high levels in the very countries that are least competitive; and banks that have become too large, driven by dangerous trends in ‘capital markets banking’. The paper explains how counterparty risk spreads between banks and how the sovereign and banking crises are serving to exacerbate each other. Of all the policies proposed, the paper highlights those that are coherent and the magnitudes involved if the euro is not to fracture.
  23 mars 2012 Cliquez pour accéder: 
    http://oecd.metastore.ingenta.com/content/2711021ec012.pdf
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The Financial Industry in the New Regulatory Landscape
Gert Wehinger
The financial market outlook and risks as well as the impact of regulatory reforms on the financial sector were the topics discussed at the October 2011 OECD Financial Roundtable. Concerns about the current situation in financial markets were centred on the sovereign debt and banking crisis in Europe and its repercussions in other parts of the world. Many participants felt that policy makers had not been doing enough to address the crisis and that bold action and ‘circuit breakers’ to stop the negative feedback loops were needed to restore market confidence. Regarding regulation, while the financial industry broadly expressed support for Basel III reforms, some elements like the SIFI surcharge were criticised. The industry was also sceptical regarding the benefits of separation of banks’ businesses (Volcker rule, Vickers proposal) and broadly rejected the EU proposal of a financial transaction tax. While policy makers regarded some of the industry’s regulatory concerns as valid, they stressed the aim of regulatory reforms to make the financial sector safer, thus making downsizing of a certain kind of financial intermediation unavoidable. But the right balance needs to be found in terms of the extent and the timing of regulatory reforms; downsizing in the current situation should perhaps be encouraged less quickly in some cases.
  23 mars 2012 Cliquez pour accéder: 
    http://oecd.metastore.ingenta.com/content/2711021ec001.pdf
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Highlights from the OECD Sovereign Borrowing Outlook 2012
Hans J. Blommestein, Ahmet Keskinler, Perla Ibarlucea Flores
OECD governments are facing unprecedented challenges in the markets for government securities as a result of continued strong borrowing amid a highly uncertain environment with growing concerns about the pace of recovery, surging borrowing costs, sovereign risk and contagion pressures.
  23 mars 2012 Cliquez pour accéder: 
    http://oecd.metastore.ingenta.com/content/2711021ec014.pdf
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The Future of Debt Markets
Hans J. Blommestein, Alison Harwood, Allison Holland
Discussions at the 12th OECD-WBG-IMF Global Bond Market Forum focused on three key areas related to the future of debt markets: i) the challenges facing new and infrequent sovereign issuers in assuring durable market access in frontier and emerging markets; ii) the future prospects for the securitisation and covered bond markets; and iii) the future role of large bond investors.
  23 mars 2012 Cliquez pour accéder: 
    http://oecd.metastore.ingenta.com/content/2711021ec015.pdf
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Index of Recent Features
OCDE

This Index of Recent Features covers FMT issues from Vol. 2008/2, Dec 2008, through to the 2011 Special Supplement.

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