OECD Working Papers on Sovereign Borrowing and Public Debt Management

ISSN :
2226-4132 (en ligne)
DOI :
10.1787/22264132
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OECD Working Papers on Sovereign Borrowing and Public Debt Management provide authoritative information on technical and policy issues in the area of public debt management (PDM) and government securities markets. Studies track closely structural issues, trends and challenges in government debt policies and markets. Topics include pressing government debt policy issues such as the measurement of sovereign risk; how to contain the cost of government borrowing operations; the use of electronic systems; sovereign asset and liability management (SALM); liquidity of markets in government debt; advances in risk management; the role of derivatives in PDM; linkages between PDM and monetary policy and the role of debt managers in pricing and managing contingent liabilities.

These studies are prepared for dissemination among sovereign debt managers, financial policy makers, regulators, financial market participants, rating agencies, and academics. By providing information on this highly specialised field of government activity and policy, papers aim to stimulate discussions among a wider audience as well as further analysis.

 

Interactions Between Sovereign Debt Management and Monetary Policy Under Fiscal Dominance and Financial Instability You or your institution have access to this content

Auteur(s):
Hans J. Blommestein, Philip Turner1
Author Affiliations
  • 1: Bank for International Settlements, Suisse

Date de publication
20 fév 2012
Bibliographic information
N°:
3
Pages
29
DOI
10.1787/5k9fdwrnd1g3-en

Cacher / Voir l'abstract

This paper argues that serious fiscal vulnerabilities arising from many years of high government debt will create new and complex interactions between public debt management (PDM) and monetary policy (MP). The paper notes that, although their formal mandates have not changed, recent balance sheet policies of many Central Banks (CBs) have tended to blur the separation of their policies from fiscal policy (FP). The mandates of debt management offices (DMOs) have usually had a microeconomic focus (viz, keeping government debt markets liquid, limiting refunding risks etc). Such mandates have usually eschewed any macroeconomic policy dimension. For these reasons, all clashes in policy mandate between CBs and DMOs have been latent and not overt.
Mots-clés:
policy coordination, debt, monetary policy, debt management, policy designs and consistency, central banks and their policies, policy objectives, sovereign debt
Classification JEL:
  • E52: Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics / Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit / Monetary Policy
  • E58: Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics / Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit / Central Banks and Their Policies
  • E61: Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics / Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook / Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
  • H63: Public Economics / National Budget, Deficit, and Debt / Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt